President Eisenhower and the NATO Essay Example for Free

President Eisenhower and the NATO Essay Stephen Ambrose, in his book Eisenhower: The President (pp. 215 – 216) gives a picture of the president as the driving force behind the NATO solution embodied in the Paris accords of late 1954. Is he right or wrong? The abrupt end of the World War II following the bombing of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki using atomic bombs heralded a period of heightened tension between the Western World represented by the US and the Eastern World represented by Soviet Union. Each of the two sides formed a myriad of alliances in bid to assert themselves across the face of the world. NATO was one such alliance that was purposely formed by the Capitalists (US and allies) to contain Communists (Soviet and allies). Though initially the alliance was more of a political organization than a military one, subsequent happenings in Europe, particularly the Korean War electrified the member states into forming a strong military alliance, with an integrated military structure built under the direction of two US military commanders, one of them Eisenhower. The militarization of the alliance was necessary especially having in mind that the opposing blocs (communists) were in the process of building their own strong military arsenals and therefore there was need for a balance of power between the two blocs. Again, this was a period marked by costly defense spending, immense conventional and nuclear arms race, and a number of proxy wars. [Rosenberg, 1979] In his book, Ambrose seeks to differ with Eisenhower’s friends as well as critics who regarded him as largely unprepared for the presidency. He depicts Eisenhower as one person who carried the best credentials among persons to ever been elected to the Presidency, particularly in matters concerning foreign affairs. Ambrose has got all the reasons to throw his weight behind Eisenhower’s foreign relations capabilities, given the success that he (Eisenhower) achieved when he served at various military ranks in international duty during the World Wars and the Cold War, the most notable one being his appointment as the first commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [Ambrose, 1984] Until his election as the 34th US President, Eisenhower was serving as the supreme commander of the NATO forces in Europe. Moreover, in his inaugural speech he vowed to use his experience to end the Korean War. Being an experienced soldier and therefore understanding the painful impact of the modern weapons than any other person, he resolved to appeal for peace. To achieve this he advocated for high level of cooperation among the nations even among those who disagreed. He rejected the notion of an isolated America from the rest of the world, save behind its nuclear shield. He harbored the argument that active participation of the US in the world affairs was the most appropriate method of making sure that democracy was achieved in nations that were susceptible to the encroachment of Communism. He also harbored the belief that sustained dialogue between the US and the Soviet would be the best option for the provision of security to the entire world. To achieve this, he advocated for military and economic unification of the nations that formed the Western alliance, since according to him that was the only avenue for providing the much needed peace and freedom in the Western Europe. For example, he pursued the reinforcement of NATO’s southern flank by helping Italian-Yugoslavian struggle over Trieste and proposed at the Geneva summit meeting a shared aerial inspection, a move that was aimed at preventing a surprise nuclear attack. He also proposed for a project known as ‘atoms for peace’ program, that sought to provide loans to American uranium to ‘have not’ nations for peaceful purposes. [Boll, 1988] In what seems to a support for the argument that Eisenhower understood the painful repercussions of war, Campbell Craig claims that Eisenhower used the policy of nuclear weapons deterrence to scare his advisors to shy from pushing him to declare war against the communists, and also to deter the communists themselves into going into war with the West, represented by the US. In his book Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War; Campbell Craig argues that Eisenhower’s policy of defending the United States international interests was through general thermonuclear war. [Craig, 1998: p. xi] He reasons that between 1956 and 1957 Eisenhower rearranged the official American basic security policy in a way that, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the war would automatically escalate into general thermonuclear war. [p. 67]. The very threat of a thermonuclear war would serve as a deterrence of such a war on a national level since the US policy makers will definitely resist escalation in a crisis. Craig puts it this way, â€Å"Eisenhower’s strategy to evade nuclear war was to make American military policy so dangerous that his advisors would find it impossible to push Eisenhower towards war and away from compromise. † [p. 69]. This also served as deterrence to the Soviet Union as the prospect of going into a war that would escalate into thermonuclear war was so scarring. A fair analysis on Craig’s work is that, it is short of neither supporting the use of rigid defense of nuclear weapons nor rejecting their strategic use. Consequently, Craig does not seem to support or refute the claim that Eisenhower was directly behind the NATO solution to the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies. He lets his audience to make a conclusion; however, his arguments seem to lean more on the notion that Eisenhower used nuclear weapon diplomacy and the strengthening of the NATO and unification of the states that formed the treaty. He argues that â€Å"American avoidance of nuclear war †¦ did not just â€Å"happen. † Actual people, above all Eisenhower, sought to evade nuclear war; many powerful figures at the center of decision believed that such a war was justifiable and regularly called for steps that would have begun one. [P. xii] Soman argues that, during the period of crisis, between the years 954-1955, the Eisenhower’s administration was mainly concerned on the fate of the treaty for the Western European Union and the admission of Germany to NATO, which was to be ratified by the European nations. Particularly, the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles was filled with the fear that any event leading to a war with China that would involve nuclear weapons would move the European opinion away from the United States and therefore leading doubts on the ratification of the treaty. Soman argues that Eisenhower’s success just like many other US Presidents of post-World War II era in maintaining the United States national security and the strengthening of the NATO in the face of military threats from the Soviets was through the use of nuclear weapon diplomacy. For instance, he explains how American atomic capabilities contributed to the working out of a truce in the North Korean war. He reasons that, Eisenhower had no option in the use of nuclear diplomacy to counter the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies: he had inherited â€Å"†¦ a stalemated war in the Korea, a costly military build up, and armed forces that despite nearly three years of massive conventional rearmament still left the United States heavily dependent on atomic arsenal. † [Soman, 2000: p. 36] He therefore chose to reject any Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons knowing very well that this was his only trump card.